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DDA 82-2604

2 November 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA:

Executive Director

FROM:

Harry E. Fitzwater

Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT:

Contracting for the Polygraphing of Contractors

- 1. In accordance with your direction to contract for the polygraphing of contractors, the Office of Security has contacted several Agency annuitants to determine if any of them would be willing to form a small organization to do this job. We are awaiting their response but in the meantime are continuing to explore other leads. A large organization is not required since the only personnel resources currently dedicated to the polygraphing of contractor employees is an Agency husband and wife team who life on the west coast. The husband works full time and the wife works approximately two days a week.
- 2. There are polygraph organizations used for clearance of commercial people but none that we would recommend using for sensitive intelligence programs. I am informed that the Office of Security has scrubbed this list thoroughly.
- 3. Incidentally, and for clarification, the number of polygraph operators dedicated to the industrial polygraph program has little effect on the clearance and processing time of contractor employees since the majority of employees are never polygraphed. The vast majority (98 percent) of those polygraphed are after they have had access to classified material. The backlog of industrial clearances is generated by the lack of investigative agents. Initially we looked at contracting out investigations but believe hiring more confidential correspondents (annuitants) is more cost effective. We have now doubled our confidential correspondent staffing to reduce the backlog and processing time. Since 1 February 1982, Security has sustained a level of closing about industrial field investigations per month.
- 4. I hope you will agree with the approach that we are taking in this matter. If so, we will try to implement it as soon as possible.

Havny E. Fitzwater


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
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Havny E. Fitzwater

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR



25 October 1982

NOTE FOR: DDA

Some time ago the DDCI asked you to contract out polygraphs of contractors and to divert any freed up resources toward the staff reinvestigation program. Would you please let us know if this has been done.

EA/DDCI

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